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Testimony of Mark D. Young 
 
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
Hearing: Proposed Legislation to Amend the Commodity Exchange Act 
July 11, 2008 
U.S. House Committee on Agriculture at a Hearing  
 
 
 Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Mark Young, appearing on behalf of 
the Futures Industry Association.  FIA appreciates the opportunity to present its views to the 
Committee on the pending legislation to address futures regulation and energy prices.   
 FIA regular member firms are registered with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission as futures commission merchants (“FCMs”).   FIA’s FCM member firms execute 
customer orders for and provide the financial guarantees underwriting more than 90% of the 
futures contracts traded on U.S. exchanges.  FIA member firms also play a substantial role in 
executing and clearing orders for customers world-wide in futures contracts traded on non-U.S. 
exchanges.  As the leading trade association for the U.S. futures industry, FIA and its member 
firms have an acute interest in the many legislative proposals you are considering.   
 FIA has a long record with this Committee.  We have supported every legislative reform 
of futures regulation dating back to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 as 
well as each Reauthorization of the CFTC since 1978.  As in the past, FIA is committed to 
working with this Committee on constructive legislation to modernize regulation and adapt to the 
ever quickening pace of change in futures trading around the world.  
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 While I suspect FIA, led by John Damgard, is well known to many members of this 
Committee,  I am sure I am not as well known.  I am a partner in the law firm of Kirkland and 
Ellis, LLP in the Washington, DC office.  In 1977, I joined the CFTC’s legal staff when I 
graduated from law school.  I then moved to Kirkland in 1982.  I have represented clients in 
every CFTC reauthorization from 1978 to 2008.   I now represent FIA on a variety of legislative, 
litigation and regulatory matters.  I represent other clients as well on a variety of regulatory and 
litigation matters.  I do not now represent any U.S. futures exchanges or foreign futures 
exchanges.  Also, since 1991, I have taught a course in Derivatives Regulation as an Adjunct 
Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center.   
 FIA and its members have long believed that futures market price integrity is a 
paramount concern.  FIA does not support higher prices or lower prices on any market.  FIA 
does support having prices discovered openly and competitively on what the Commodity 
Exchange Act calls, "liquid, fair and financially secure trading facilities." 
 In 1974, this Committee described the Commodity Exchange Act as a “comprehensive 
regulatory structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex,” a description 
the U.S. Supreme Court later called an “apt[] characteriz[ation].”1   Amending this complex 
structure, under even the best of circumstances, can be a difficult challenge.  FIA thanks this 
Committee for your thorough and thoughtful approach to deliberating on the benefits and costs 
of the many different legislative proposals before you. 
  FIA views each legislative proposal through the lens of seven basic principles. 
                                                 
1
  Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 355-356 (1982). 
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1. Futures trading serves the congressionally-endorsed national public interests in 
commodity price risk management and commodity price discovery.  Price manipulation robs 
futures markets of their ability to serve those public interests.   
2. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission now has vast powers to prevent price 
manipulation, ranging from position limits and vigorous enforcement actions to transparent 
market surveillance and emergency powers .  The CFTC is an effective agency; it needs 
additional resources more than it needs additional powers. 
3. Speculators are essential for futures markets, as the Supreme Court and many  
commentators have found.2  Without speculators, U.S. futures markets would not serve the 
national public interest.  Speculation is not price manipulation.  Those who claim it is would 
also equate oxygen with air pollution. 
4. Congress should not enact legislation that would create disincentives for futures business 
to be conducted through U.S. firms and on U.S. markets, which could cost U.S. jobs.  Congress 
should also not enact legislation that would  hinder the CFTC’s market oversight and price 
transparency. 
5. The forces of globalization and technological innovation are linking economic and 
financial activities world-wide more every day.  No legislation could repeal that market reality.  
6. Loopholes are a misnomer.  Congress made many deliberate and realistic policy choices 
from 1982 to 2000, many of which originated in this Committee.  Each was intended to serve the 
public interest, not any special interest. Those choices have served the public interest well, 
resulting in strong growth, more transparency and less financial risk in U.S. derivatives markets.  
7. The CFTC’s legal authority over U.S. futures exchanges, traders and firms is and must be 
greater and more direct than its legal authority over foreign futures exchanges, traders and firms.  
International cooperation and coordination is therefore an essential component of effective 
market surveillance for global markets. 
 Along with other financial services trade associations, FIA has provided a list of 
measures Congress should enact to deal with the current market situation .  Those 
                                                 
2
  Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 390 (speculators play a “crucial role in an effective and orderly 
futures market”);  Economist, “Don’t blame the Speculators,” July 5-11, (at.15-16 (“speculators provide a vital 
service”); Robert Samuelson, ”Lets Shoot the Speculators,” Newsweek, July 7-14, 2008 (“What makes the futures 
markets work is the large number of purely financial players—"speculators" just in it for the money—who often 
take the other side of hedgers' trades.”); Richard W. Rahn, “Greedy Speculators,” Washington Times, June 25, 2008 
at A22 (“There are many...market speculators who provide liquidity to the market and fill the void if the numbers of 
short and long hedgers do not match up.”); J. Nocera, “Easy Target, But Not The Right One,” New York Times, 
June 28, 2008 at B1. 
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recommendations are included as Appendix A.   For this hearing, the Committee has grouped the 
issues presented in the pending legislative proposals into six categories.  FIA’s thoughts on each 
area follow.  We emphasize the foreign board of trade issue because it is the primary area of 
concern to the clearing firms that  comprise our core membership. 
FOREIGN BOARDS OF TRADE 
Background 
 In 1982, Congress determined that futures contracts traded on an exchange “located 
outside the U.S.” -- called a “foreign board of trade” -- would be excused from the requirement 
that futures contracts in the U.S. must be traded on a CFTC-approved exchange.  That 
requirement remains the law today unless a statutory or regulatory exclusion or  exemption is 
applicable.  In 1982, Congress also specified that the CFTC could not directly regulate foreign 
boards of trade or their operations.  For well over a decade, this provision was non-controversial 
and applied in a legally certain atmosphere: an exchange was considered to be “located” where 
its trading floor was located and U.S. customers accessed foreign boards of trade without 
incident.  
 In recent years, matching engines, trading terminals, servers and web access allowed any 
exchange anywhere in the world to access U.S. customers directly.  Because issues were raised 
about whether these developments affected where an exchange was “located,” the CFTC and its 
staff developed a no-action approach.  Through the no-action process, the CFTC  was able to 
condition the ability of a foreign board of trade to conduct business with firms and customers in 
the U.S.  One important condition is the level of cooperation the CFTC could receive from a 
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foreign board of trade’s foreign regulator, what the CEA defines as a “foreign futures authority.”  
To date, the CFTC’s web-site lists 20 of these no-action letters issued to foreign boards of trade. 
 As commodity markets have become more international in scope and electronic trade 
execution mechanisms have become predominant, U.S. and foreign exchanges have begun some 
level of direct competition. U.S. futures exchanges have attempted to engage in direct 
competition with certain foreign futures exchanges and foreign exchanges have attempted to 
engage in direct competition with certain U.S. exchanges.  For example, in recent years the 
Chicago Board of Trade offered replicas of the German Bund, Bobl and Shatz futures contracts 
which trade successfully on EUREX, the German-Swiss Exchange.  The New York Mercantile 
Exchange also trades a Brent Oil futures contract which is a cash-settled version of the same 
contract which first traded on what is now ICE Futures Europe. Competition is a two way street.  
ICE Futures Europe also has listed and trades a cash-settled clone of the bellwether WTI crude 
oil futures contract traded at NYMEX. 
 FIA strongly supports direct competition among trading facilities both within the U.S and 
globally.  Competition leads to more liquidity, lower trading costs, tighter spreads, and more 
innovation.  It does, however, complicate market surveillance.  It is easier to know who is trading 
what futures contracts on one exchange, than on multiple exchanges.  It is also easier for a single 
dominant designated contract market to discharge its statutory duty to prevent manipulation on 
its own market without having to worry about trading in the same commodity on the market of 
its competitor, the “challenger” exchange.   The CFTC has determined that direct competition is 
important to promote and that the agency itself will bridge the gap in market surveillance among 
different exchanges trading the same product when these instances of direct competition arise.  
FIA has endorsed the CFTC’s determination and actions to promote exchange competition. 
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 Competition does promote innovation.  For example, in response to the ICE Futures 
Europe decision to list a NYMEX-replica WTI crude oil futures contract and the immediate 
success ICE experienced through electronic trading in a contract that previously could only be 
traded on the NYMEX trading floor, NYMEX accelerated its efforts to allow electronic trading 
for its WTI contract.  In response, the CFTC has taken a number of pro-active steps, with the 
cooperation of ICE’s regulator, the UK Financial Services Authority, to make sure that the 
CFTC’s market surveillance picture for both markets is clear and transparent.  Again, FIA 
endorses the measures the CFTC has implemented and commends the agency for its leadership 
and initiative. 
Current Proposals 
 We understand that many want to codify in the CEA the CFTC’s market surveillance 
protocols where a foreign-based and regulated exchange attempts to compete with a U.S. 
exchange for market share in a particular futures contract.  FIA supports that goal.  Competition 
should not compromise market surveillance.  When two exchanges, no matter where located, 
compete for trading volume in the same product, the CFTC has heightened market surveillance 
responsibilities and its traditional market surveillance tools need to be adjusted to make sure that 
the CFTC has any and all data to prevent price manipulation or other major market disturbances. 
  As this Committee understands well, with most CEA proposals it is particularly 
important to target the legislative language to address the specific problem at issue and to avoid 
triggering legal and business consequences that would undermine the intended policy goal or 
have other unintended repercussions.  In this instance, it is essential that any proposal adopted by 
the Committee not unintentionally harm the CFTC’s efforts to enhance its surveillance 
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capabilities by pushing more market activity to less transparent venues where the trading data the 
CFTC may need would not be readily available.   
 FIA has reviewed the pending proposals and our list of concerns with each proposal is 
found at Appendex B to this testimony.  Overall, FIA fears that the proposals in the FBOT 
area that have been introduced to date would inadvertently harm both the CFTC’s ability 
to prevent manipulation and the competitiveness of U.S. brokerage firms, while potentially 
leading to trade-war type retaliation from foreign governments against U.S. exchanges.  
Some of these proposals are drafted in a circular manner so that only foreign exchanges 
otherwise excused from CFTC oversight by statute would be subject to the heightened 
surveillance requirements.  Other proposals enable  FBOTs to evade the contemplated mandated 
CFTC regulation of FBOT self-regulatory operations by simply refusing to deal with U.S. traders 
and firms, while welcoming the business of any overseas affiliates of these same traders and 
firms.  This has happened before in the context of security futures products and other trading 
instruments.  In fact, some U.S. clearing firms have moved or may be compelled to move their 
operational and processing facilities out of the U.S. for just this reason. The results?  No direct  
CFTC transparency for these FBOT trades, leading to increased manipulation risk and increased 
systemic financial risk on the clearing side, and a weakened business base for U.S. traders and 
firms (which creates a disincentive to even start such a business in the U.S.).       
 FIA also believes that any legislation in this area should be symmetrical because 
competition is global and U.S. exchanges do try to wrest market share from foreign boards of 
trade in various products, a competitive trend we hope will continue.  Foreign futures authorities 
have as much interest in preventing price manipulation in their jurisdictions as the CFTC does 
here.  None of the introduced proposals addresses this market and regulatory reality. 
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 As mentioned earlier, FIA shares the policy goals of many of the introduced FBOT 
proposals: to enhance CFTC surveillance where warranted to deal with competition among 
foreign and U.S. exchanges in energy futures trading and to prevent market manipulation.  To 
achieve those objectives, FIA recommends that the Committee consider the following type of 
provision: 
When a foreign board of trade lists for trading an energy futures 
contract that is linked to the settlement price of an energy futures 
contract trading on a U.S. futures exchange (or vice versa) and 
when the CFTC (or its foreign regulatory counterpart) believes 
enhanced market surveillance is necessary or appropriate, then the 
CFTC and its foreign counterpart should immediately consult on, 
develop and implement heightened surveillance measures to 
prevent price manipulation and ensure transparent, coordinated 
market surveillance. 
 
This approach will not only codify and strengthen the process and procedures the CFTC already 
has implemented with respect to ICE Futures Europe and its coordinated efforts with the FSA, it 
would build upon the CFTC leadership in this area to promote international consultation and 
coordinated regulatory responses.  We would be leading the world in a common  and important 
mission -- the prevention of price manipulation any time, anywhere.   We would not be telling 
the world how that mission must be accomplished or that every CFTC or U.S. exchange 
requirement must be replicated in every instance.  We would be leading, not dictating. 
 FIA also is very concerned that some legislative proposals in the FBOT area would 
operate to impose prohibitions on U.S futures commission merchant firms that accept and 
execute customer orders on FBOTs.  Unintentionally and inadvertently, these proposals would 
make U.S. firms liable if an FBOT fails to comply with U.S. law.  They could also be read to 
allow customers to sue U.S. firms to void or rescind foreign futures contracts if the FBOT fails to 
comply with the CFTC-imposed regulatory conditions.  When executing and clearing orders 
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for U.S. or foreign customers, U.S. FCMs should not be guaranteeing the regulatory 
compliance of FBOTs.  Specific statutory safe harbors and exemptions are needed to prevent 
CFTC-registered professionals from bearing the legal risk of FBOT non-compliance.  Otherwise 
investment banks and other clearing firms will simply and sensibly decide to run their futures 
brokerage and clearing businesses through overseas affiliates to avoid that potential liability.  
 The foreign board of trade issue is vitally important to the future commercial viability of 
the U.S. FCM community which comprises the core of the FIA’s membership.  We would be 
happy to consult with the Committee and its staff on specific legislative language to achieve the 
objectives of much of the FBOT legislation proposed to date without the adverse consequences 
outlined above.  
Swaps:  Treating Energy Commodities Like Agricultural Commodities 
 Under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Congress prescribed different 
levels of CFTC oversight and regulation for different trading systems, different market 
participants and different commodities.  Generally, Congress determined that trading on 
multilateral trading facilities, where many market participants may execute trades with other 
market participants (so-called “many to many” markets), replicated the trading structure of 
traditional futures trading pits and should not be excused from CFTC regulation.  Also trading 
among only Eligible Contract Participants, essentially well-capitalized, sophisticated or regulated 
entities, might not  require full CFTC regulation and oversight because each ECP would be 
capable of protecting itself.  And transactions in financial, energy and metals commodities did 
not implicate the same historical CEA regulatory concerns about market manipulation as did 
futures on agricultural commodities, which are the only commodities subject to CFTC-set 
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speculative limits for futures trading on an exchange.  Building on those concepts, Congress 
extended legal certainty to non-agricultural commodity transactions among ECPs by excluding 
or exempting those transactions from the CEA when the transactions were not executed on a 
trading facility.3 
 Agricultural options and swaps transactions, however, may still be exempted from the 
CEA’s exchange-trading requirement, among other regulatory provisions, under a CFTC 
exemption found in Part 35 of its Rulebook and adopted under Section 4(c) of the CEA, as 
enacted in 1992.  Under the Part 35 rules, non-standardized and non-fungible derivatives 
transactions among Eligible Swap Participants (again, well-capitalized, sophisticated parties) are 
generally exempt from the CEA unless traded on a multilateral transaction execution facility or 
submitted to a futures-style clearing system. These otherwise exempt agricultural transactions are 
still subject to the CEA’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation prohibitions. 
 The CFMA exemptions and exclusions in the energy area represented an attempt 
statutorily to increase price transparency and remove systemic financial risk in over-the-counter 
energy transactions.  And those provisions have worked as intended.  ICE and other market 
innovators have developed methods of increasing price transparency for energy swaps in less 
than fully multilateral electronic trading systems.  It is uncertain whether those swaps would be 
eligible for exemption under Part 35.  What is certain is that none of those energy swaps could be 
subject to a futures-style clearing system unless the CFTC adopted a new exemption. Treating 
                                                 
3
  This summary oversimplifies the web of CEA exclusions and exemptions enacted in 2000.  But it captures the 
essence of CEA §§ 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(g) and 2(h).  Notably, parties engaged in exempt transactions in energy 
commodities under section 2(h) could still be subject to CFTC prosecution for energy price manipulation. 
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energy commodity swaps like agricultural commodity swaps therefore would likely diminish 
price transparency and increase financial risk for these transactions.   
 In the 2008 Farm Bill, Congress addressed the legitimate concern that exempt energy 
transactions under Section 2(h) that are traded electronically and develop into significant price 
discovery transactions should be regulated more like futures contracts than Congress envisioned 
in 2000.  Once full implemented by the CFTC, this reform will enhance price transparency and 
market oversight.  Its valuable benefits will be lost, however, if energy commodities are treated 
in the same ways as agricultural commodities and removed from the transactions eligible for 
exemption under Section 2(h)(3) of the CEA.  Like most quick fixes under the CEA, equating 
energy commodities with agricultural commodities will disserve the public interest.  FIA would 
not recommend its adoption or the approval of any  substantive amendments to CEA §§ 2(g) and 
2(h).  Instead, the reforms in the Farm Bill should be allowed to take full effect and monitored to 
determine whether any adjustment is warranted in the near future.   
Resources for the CFTC 
 FIA strongly supports the proposals for additional resources for the CFTC, including at 
least 100 new CFTC employees.  Those numbers are commensurate with the CFTC’s scope of 
responsibilities and ever expanding authority in a global and changing market place.    The bulk 
of the CFTC’s new  resources we would expect to be used to hire attorneys in the Enforcement 
Division to investigate and root out any alleged price manipulations the CFTC staff may 
uncover.  Manipulation should not be tolerated and enforcement actions for past misconduct are 
the best means to deter future misconduct.  
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Pension Funds and Index Trading 
 FIA strongly opposes banning any collective investment vehicles, whether they are 
pension funds, mutual funds, commodity funds or hedge funds, from participating in futures 
markets.  When the funds’ professional trading managers determine it is in the best interests of 
the funds’ investors or beneficiaries to diversify their portfolio by trading in futures markets, that 
new speculative capital and liquidity should not be shunned.  The CFTC is wisely investigating 
to determine whether index traders or any one else has engaged in price manipulation.  FIA has 
every confidence that the CFTC (along with staff from other, less directly interested, federal 
agencies) will analyze the right data and will make public its conclusions on or about September 
15, 2008.  FIA will be interested to evaluate the Commission’s analysis under that accelerated 
time table.  Until the facts are known and analyzed, however, FIA would urge all interested 
parties not to pre-judge the price effects of index trading, swap dealer net offsets in futures or 
pension fund activities. 
Speculative Limits 
 Some observers believe that swap dealers should not be considered to be hedgers when 
they enter into futures market transactions to offset the price risk of their swap transactions with 
non-physical commodity counterparties.  To the extent the CFTC study will consider this issue, 
FIA would withhold final judgment.  But it seems to make no difference from the perspective of 
the swap dealer whether its futures position is designed to manage a price risk incurred with a 
physical counterparty or a financial counterparty.  Price risk is price risk.  Swap dealers in energy 
commodities use futures to reduce their net market price risk on transactions with financial and 
physical counterparties.  If a swap dealer entered into a long swap transaction in crude oil with a  
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notional amount equal to10 futures contracts with a financial counterparty and then entered into a 
short swap transaction in crude oil with a notional amount equal to 5 futures contracts with a 
physical counterparty, the dealer could then go short 5 crude oil futures contracts on NYMEX to 
manage its net outstanding price risk.  Some proposals would disallow treating the dealer’s 5 
short futures position as a hedge; instead those proposals would insist the dealer has a 5 short 
speculative position in futures, a result which distorts both the economic reality of the swap 
dealer’s risk and any CFTC surveillance of that position.  That approach also could make it more 
costly for the dealer to margin its futures position (a cost the dealer would likely pass along to its 
swaps counterparties).   
 The better way to handle this situation is to allow the CFTC as well as the NYMEX and 
other exchanges to establish position accountability standards and to look behind the positions 
when appropriate to see whether the swap dealers or other large traders are engaged in any 
transactions that would raise surveillance concerns, without worrying about the classification of 
a position as hedge or speculative.  Current law and DCM core principles accomplish that kind 
of flexibility.  Indeed, under NYMEX rules, the hedge vs. speculation classification only really 
matters for position limit purposes during the last three trading days in every contract when 
speculative position limits first become applicable. 
Margin 
 U.S. futures exchanges should set margins, not the U.S. government.  Exchanges and 
their clearing entities set margins to balance credit risk considerations against other market 
interests.  It is a delicate business judgment that goes to the heart of exchange operations and 
should be left to the exchanges.  In the context of crude oil prices, there is no evidence that 
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NYMEX has abdicated its authority in any way in this area.  To the contrary, from January 2, 
2007 through July 3, 2008, NYMEX has increased its margin for WTI crude oil futures for non-
member speculators by about 270% in absolute terms and about 50% when compared to the 
notional amount  per contract. 
Conclusion 
 Record high gasoline prices are creating challenges and hardships in our national and 
international economy.  If FIA believed that some reform to futures regulatory surveillance 
practices would reduce those challenges and hardships, we would not hesitate to recommend 
those reforms.   But FIA is not aware of any proposed change to the CEA that is likely to result 
quickly, automatically and permanently in a decline in the price of crude oil.  We are aware of 
statutory proposals that would substantially and adversely affect U.S. futures firms and markets, 
price transparency, systemic risk, and competition.  These proposals threaten the viability of 
many services our member firms now provide to customers in the U.S. and overseas.  Those 
proposals should not be adopted by this Committee and Congress.  
 FIA respectfully requests that the Committee continue to proceed with caution in 
considering the pending proposals.  We look forward to working with the Committee and its staff 
to fashion meaningful, realistic and targeted legislation to enhance market surveillance for 
energy futures markets and to strengthen the CFTC’s regulatory muscle over the ever changing 
dynamic of futures trading activities. 




WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD DO 
 
• Congress should call on the President to immediately send a request for emergency 
appropriations to allow the CFTC to increase oversight, improve the Commission’s 
information technology, and hire at least 100 new full time employees. 
 
• Congress should instruct the Commission to add at least 100 new full time employees 
in order to increase surveillance of the market, improve enforcement and otherwise 
carry out the purposes of the Act. 
 
• Congress should require the CFTC to obtain all necessary market surveillance 
information to prevent market manipulation. 
 
• Congress should require the CFTC to report to Congress regarding the effectiveness 
of its expanded information-sharing arrangement with the FSA, and the results of its 
review of the scope of commodity index trading in the futures market, and its 
recommendations for any changes to its authority or rules, including any 
modifications to the Commitment of Traders reports as necessary to provide 
increased transparency in energy derivative markets. 
 
• Congress should instruct the Commission to undertake a comprehensive report, in 
conjunction with other futures and options regulators world-wide, relating to 
differences in regulatory regimes worldwide as well as the role of institutional 
investors, speculators and other participants in the markets. 
 
    
 
 
Appendix B  
Futures Industry Association -- Concerns Relating to Foreign Board of 
Trade (“FBOT”) Legislative  Proposals 
1. HR 6284 (Mattheson), HR 6334 (Etheridge), S2995 (Levin), 
S3044(Reid), S3129 (Levin), S3130 (Durbin) -- CFTC may grant 
§ 4(a) relief only for FBOT with comparable regulation and willing 
to submit trading data to CFTC  
(a) “Located outside.” Applies only to foreign boards of trade 
which, by definition, are located outside the U.S. and 
therefore do not need § 4(a) relief. Because FBOTs need no 
§ 4(a) relief the provision is ineffective and self-defeating. 
(b) “Cash-settled.”  Applies only to FBOTs “with respect to an 
energy commodity that is  physically delivered in the U.S.”   
FBOT contracts that are cash-settled would not be covered by 
the provision.  ICE Futures Europe’s WTI futures contract is 
cash-settled and does not call for physical delivery of any 
energy commodity.1  
(c) Attempts to impose direct CFTC regulation on FBOTs in a 
number of areas.  In response and to avoid duplicative 
regulatory oversight, FBOTs are likely to close off foreign 
markets from U.S. market participants and firms.  FBOTs 
will simply refuse to take orders from US firms and traders.  
FBOT business may not suffer; firms and traders will 
                                                 
1
  HR 6349 (Marshall) is substantially similar to the six enumerated bills except it does not have the physical 
delivery limitation.  It would apply if an FBOT’s energy contract refers to the price of a physically delivered 
energy contract traded on a US exchange and the contract contemplates a “primary physical delivery point” in 
the U.S.  This formulation would  allow CFTC regulation to apply to FBOT contracts that are cash-settled, 
although the concept of a primary US delivery point is not well established and may not be easy to apply in all 
circumstances.  Other than cash-settlement, HR 6349 raises all of the same issues as the six other bills listed. 
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continue to trade on the FBOT, but will trade through their 
overseas affiliates.   
(d) If FBOTs are made subject to affirmative US statutory 
requirements, US FCM firms could be liable under § 4(a) for 
an FBOT’s non-compliance because of the way § 4(a) is 
structured.  FCMs should not be insuring FBOT compliance 
with US law. 
(e) No coordination role provided for foreign futures authority 
with jurisdiction over the FBOT. 
2. HR 6341 (Van Hollen) -- Disqualifies boards of trade from being 
considered to be foreign if they have US ties and trade SPDCs in 
energy. 
(a) Harms CFTC Surveillance Transparency.  Any FBOT could 
avoid US jurisdiction by not affiliating with an entity in the 
US or not having any infrastructure in US.  FBOTs could set 
up matching engines outside the US, with servers outside the 
US  and no direct US presence.  FBOTs would not need any 
CFTC relief.  CFTC would lose all possible leverage in 
trying to obtain surveillance information. 
(b) If CFTC determines an exchange with US ties trades a 
Significant Price Discovery Contract (a new statutory term 
designed to serve a very different purpose) in any energy 
commodity, then that contract becomes illegal to trade in the 
US unless the FBOT becomes a DCM.  Making illegal a 
contract that others are using for price discovery -- 
theoretically world-wide -- will harm the price discovery 
process and may cause serious commercial harm in the 
energy markets.   
(c) It is unclear how to apply the SPDC criteria from the Farm 
Bill to an international market.  The SPDC criteria were 
developed to discern price discovery contracts in the U.S., 
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not in overseas markets. Is the CFTC supposed to make a 
national or international SPDC determination? 
(d) Would encourage foreign exchanges to bar US traders and 
firms from participating in their markets.  Congress may 
want US parties to participate in energy price discovery 
rather than leave price discovery just to parties in the Middle 
East and other parts of the world.   
(e) Requires ICE Futures Europe to become a US designated 
contract market.  Could spark trade-war style retaliation. 
3. HR 6330 (Stupak)  --  Makes illegal non-DCM energy futures if 
delivery point in US or “transacted” on a terminal in US. 
(a) Would not apply to cash-settled transactions on an FBOT. 
(b) Exchanges now rely less on dedicated terminals for trading.  
Modern technology and web-access make trading easier to 
access from anywhere in the world.  FBOT do not need to 
have terminals in the US.  If FBOTs don’t have terminals in 
the US, the CEA doesn’t apply to those FBOTs’ contracts. 
(c) Excuses an energy contract from coverage under the CEA 
unless it calls for delivery point in the US or is transacted on 
a US terminal.  An FBOT could list a cash-settled energy 
contract and allow US traders access from web-sites in the 
US and not be subject to the CEA.  May actually cut back on 
CFTC authority, making transparency and market 
surveillance harder to achieve. 
(d) Misapprehends that CFTC FBOT no-actions have  relied on 
Section 4(c) exemptions (which bill seeks to nullify absent 
public comment).   No-actions are not 4(c) exemptions. 
4. HR 6130 (Barton) -- Requires CFTC within 6 months to determine 
whether to adopt a rule regarding how the CFTC determines a 
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foreign futures authority regulates its exchanges and markets in a 
way comparable to the CFTC. 
(a) Developing regulatory standards for determining 
comparability in different regulatory structures may limit 
CFTC discretion.  But providing notice to market participants 
and FBOTs of the factors the CFTC would take into account 
in making a comparability determination may not be 
problematic. 
(b) May remove CFTC flexibility by requiring FBOTs to have 
certain specific regulatory tools to achieve comparability.  
Better approach would be to determine whether anti-
manipulation protections are adequate and how well sharing 
of surveillance data on competing contracts could work. 
5. HR 6279 (Chabot)  --  Same as bills covered under Part I above, 
but adds that FBOT margin requirements must be comparable to 
US and “sufficient to reduce excessive speculation.”   
(a) DCMs in US have considerable flexibility in imposing 
margin, as they should.  They operate under core principles 
subject to CFTC oversight.   
(b) Under US law, margin is not generally designed to curb 
excessive speculation. Margin is largely a credit risk issue.  
FBOTs should not be held to a different, higher standard.  
6.  HR 6372 (Hill) --  No board of trade may be an FBOT if it has a 
US affiliate, trades a commodity other than an exempt commodity 
or trades a significant price discovery contract. 
(a) No “US affiliate” test artificially restricts cross-border 
exchange mergers with US entities. Why limit the 
commercial maneuverability of US trading facilities when 
foreign counterparts are not similarly restricted?  Also allows 
board of trade a fairly painless way to evade U.S. law. 
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(b) Energy and metals are exempt commodities.  Trading in 
those kinds of commodities would be not be affected by this 
bill.  Trading in agricultural commodities and financial 
commodities (excluded commodities) like interest rates, 
currencies and equities would be affected.  Not sure that was 
intent. 
(c) SPDC determination in Farm Bill was not developed with 
foreign or global markets in mind.  Not sure how well SPDC 
determination can be adapted to this context.  Also SPDC is 
not self-executing; it requires an affirmative CFTC 
determination.  Why would Congress want to make it illegal 
to trade a contract that businesses are relying on for 
significant price discovery. 
7. S3122 (Cantwell) -- Makes into a DCM any trading facility that a) 
“operates 1 or more trading terminals” in US; b) trades contracts 
that serve a price discovery function for a commodity delivered in 
the US and c) is regulated by a foreign regulatory agency.  
Terminates existing exemptions from DCM registration. 
(a) FBOTs  today operate under a CFTC-approved no-action 
process, not Section 4(c) exemptions. 
(b) FBOTs do not need to operate “trading terminals” in the US.  
Web access is world-wide.  Also servers that facilitate the 
pace of execution of US customer orders on FBOTs are not 
considered to be trading terminals. Servers are not trading 
terminals. 
(c) Price discovery function is an undefined, new term.  To the 
extent it is different than the “significant price discovery 
contract” definition from the 2008 Farm Bill, it is not clear 
why a new phrase is needed.  To the extent it is the same as 
the Farm Bill formulation, it is not self-executing, adds 
administrative cost to CFTC regulation, and may not be 
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applicable to energy markets traded overseas.  Also has the 
perverse consequence of penalizing a foreign exchange for 
developing an energy contract (Brent) which a US exchange 
later copies.    
 
